Fourth Generation Inclusive

Historical Documents of Genealogical Interest to Researchers of North Carolina's Free People of Color

Tag: caselaw

Daddy’s baby.

Julius A. Howell et al. v. Henry Troutman, 53 NC 304 (1860).

This Rowan County case involved a contested will.  Jacob Troutman’s last will and testament contained the following bequests and devises:

“Item 3d. I will and bequeath to Ann Allmond two hundred and fifty dollars, provided the said Ann shall live with my wife, Polly, and assist her in health and in sickness; and if the said Ann shall faithfully perform her duty to my said wife during the life of my wife or widowhood, then at the death of my said wife, I will and bequeath to the said Ann, five dollars more.”

“Item 4. All the ballance of my estate and property of every kind and description, including my gold mine and every thing else, I will and bequeath to Lucy, the infant child of the said Ann Allmond, and if the said Lucy should die without lawful children or child, then it is my will, that all I have willed to the said Lucy, shall be divided between the children of my brothers, David Troutman, John Troutman, and my sister, Sarah Earnhart’s children.”

Troutman’s execution of the will was duly proven by the three subscribing witnesses, who also testified that in their opinion he was of sound mind when he signed it.

Jacob Troutman and his wife Polly had no children.  Ann Allmond lived in their house as a housekeeper from 1849 to 1858. (Troutman died in the fall of the latter year.)  A witness at trial testified that Ann Allmond was a white woman and her daughter Lucy, in his opinion, was a mulatto; that Lucy died at about age three; and that, both before and since Lucy’s death, Troutman told him that the child was his, and accounted for her color from a fright which Ann Allmond had received while pregnant.  The witness further testified that he had done a lot of business for Jacob Troutman; that Troutman sent Ann out of the room during the drafting of the will; that the witness urged Troutman to leave his brother Henry Troutman something, but he declined, saying that Henry would spend it in litigation. The witness also stated that Troutman had become displeased with Henry because of some lawsuit they had had.

Witness James Montgomery swore that he had no doubt that Lucy was a half-blood mulatto, based on her color; that he was a neighbor and had frequent opportunities to see the child; and that Troutman believed the child was his, said he knew she was, and that he intended to make a lady of her.

Dr. J. P. Cunningham testified that he was a practicing physician in the vicinity of Jacob Troutman’s residence; that on one occasion he was called upon by Troutman to visit Lucy; that when he arrived, he found her in his arms; that he called her “daddy’s baby”; and that the child was unquestionably a negro.

Dr. John R. Wilson, also a practicing physician, testified that Lucy was, in his opinion, a mulatto, and that Troutman had once remarked to him that he loved the child as much as if she were his own, and that Allmond had gone out and picked it up somewhere.

J. C. Barnhart swore that he was a justice of the peace in the county when Ann Allmond was pregnant,  and issued a warrant for her to make her swear to the father or give bond as prescribed by law; that she gave the bond and Jacob Troutman either became her surety or procured someone to do so, he did not remember which; and that Troutman was a man of sound mind, though very illiterate.

J. M. Long, Esq., the draftsman of the will, testified that, after Lucy’s death, Troutman asked him whether another will was necessary to dispose of the part he had left for the child; that he advised him that it was not, but that the property would go over to his relatives under the provisions of the existing will.

Henry Troutman’s counsel insisted that the jury should hear testimony that the will was procured by the false representations and undue influence of Ann Allmond.  However, the County Court charged the jury that there was no evidence of such influence as would invalidate the will and, if they believed the testimony, the decedent was of sound mind; also, that the will was properly attested and executed. Henry Troutman’s counsel excepted.

The Supreme Court’s decision: The fact that Troutman bequeathed a legacy to the mulatto child of his housekeeper, a white woman, which the mother had induced him to believe was his, is no evidence that his will was obtained by fraud and undue influence. “Supposing that he did believe the child was his, and that the mother of it told him so, there is not the slightest testimony to show that she ever even asked him to make a will in favor of her and the child, or that she knew, before the will was made, that he intended to make one, or, afterwards, that he had made it.” “The truth is, that the old man, being childless by his wife, took a strange fancy to the child of his housekeeper, and whether it were his or not, he had a father’s love for it, and our law imposes no prohibition upon a man to prevent him from bestowing his property upon the object of his affection. Affection or attachment, as Sir John Nichol said, ‘would be a very strong ground of support of a testamentary act.’”

Despite our natural inclinations….

William Mayho, by his next friend, v. Edward Sears, 25 NC 224 (1842).

On 23 July 1805, John Moring of Surry County, Virginia, executed a deed of manumission for his slaves. Hannah, Patrick, Cherry, Jordan and Charlotte were to be freed immediately.  Isabel, Carter, Polly, Burwell, Maria and Willis were to be set free over the next 19 years, according to a set schedule. Thereafter, Moring moved to Orange County, North Carolina, bringing Polly with him. Prior to 1 April 1814 (her scheduled date of manumission), Polly gave birth to a daughter, who gave birth to plaintiff William Mayho in about 1830.  After 1 April 1814, Polly, her daughter and grandson lived by themselves and acted in every respect as free persons.  They were regarded as free people of color by their neighbors and recognized as such by Moring, until 1838, when he sold Mayho to Edward Sears.

The question before the North Carolina Supreme Court was whether Mayho’s mother was free at birth, or became so prior to his birth.  “There is a natural inclination in the bosom of every judge to favor the side of freedom, and a strong sympathy with the plaintiff, and the other persons situated as he is, who have been allowed to think themselves free and act for so long a time as if they were; and, if we were permitted to decide this controversy according to our feelings, we should with promptness and pleasure pronounce or judgment for the plaintiff.  But the court is to be governed by a different rule, the impartial and unyielding rule of the law; and, after, giving to the case an anxious and deliberate consideration, we find ourselves obliged to hold, that in the law the condition of the plaintiff is that of slavery.”  In other words, applying the laws of Virginia, Polly was still a slave when her daughter was born, making the daughter a slave, and Mayho a slave in turn.

A separate and distinct class.

The State v. Elijah Newsom, 27 NC 250 (1844).

The law: “Be it enacted, &c. That if any free negro, mulatto, or free person of color, shall wear of carry about his or her person, or keep in his or her house, any shot gun, musket, rifle, pistol, sword, dagger or bowie-knife, unless he or she shall have obtained a licence therefor from the Court of Pleas and Quarter Sessions of his or her county, within one year preceding the wearing, keeping or carrying thereof, he or she shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and may be indicted therefor.”

In Cumberland County, Elijah Newsom, a free person of color, was indicted for carrying a shotgun without a license on 1 June 1843.  He was found guilty in Superior Court and filed an appeal.  The Supreme Court held that the law violated neither the 2nd Amendment nor Article 3 of the Bill of Rights: “From the earliest period of our history, free people of color have been among us, as a separate and distinct class, requiring, from necessity, in many cases, separate and distinct legislation.” “Free people of color in this State are not to be considered as citizens, in the largest sense of the term, or, if they are, they occupy such a position in society, as justifies, the legislature in adopting a course of policy in its acts peculiar to them — so that they do not violate those great principles of justice, which lie at the foundation of all laws.” Judgment upheld.

In the 1860 census of Cumberland County, Elijah Neuson, 80, “turpentiner,” is listed with wife Clarisa, 60.

A mere question.

Samuel Scott v. Joseph Williams, 12 NC 376 (1828).

Samuel Scott sued Joseph Williams for assault and battery and false imprisonment.  Jane Scott, an allegedly free woman, had been indented to Williams’ father, and Samuel was “given” to Williams by his father as a slave.  Samuel proved at trial that he was the son of Jemima, who was the daughter of Jane Scott, and the question was whether Jane was free.  The trial judge instructed the jury that Jane’s “colour might enter into their consideration” in making the determination.  “If she was of a black African complexion, they might presume from that fact, that she was a slave; if she was of a yellow complexion, no presumption of slavery arose from her color.”  The jury returned a verdict for Scott with substantial damages, and Williams appealed.  Williams argued that the jury instructions were incorrect and that damages ought to be minimal as “it was an action brought to decide a mere question of property between innocent persons.”  The Supreme Court demurred, refused to grant a new trial, and affirmed the judgment.

Milly’s Mary Ann?

Fanshaw v. Jones, 33 NC 154 (1850).

Henry Britt found an infant mulatto child at his doorstep in Currituck County. He took the baby in, named her Mary Ann, reared her as a free child and, at his death, left her $200.  Britt’s wife dissented from the will, asserting that Mary Ann was in fact a slave.  The purported evidence: about 1829, one Wilson, a Caswell County “negro-trader,” sold to one Willis a pregnant slave named Milly. Milly ran away from Willis to the house of a widow who lived near Britt, “bringing with her a female infant, perfectly naked and apparently not more than a day old.”  The widow told Milly that she and the baby would die if they remained exposed in the woods and advised her to return to her owner.  Milly left, and a few days later an infant, Mary Ann, was found at Britt’s.  The widow could not swear that Milly’s baby was Mary Ann, but Mary Ann was a “bright mulatto” and resembled Milly.  Britt and his wife were childless and brought the child up “tenderly,” becoming much attached.  After about four years, Willis showed up to claim Mary Ann, but Britt refused to give her up without valid title and asserted his belief that she was the child of a white man and a colored woman.  After Britt’s death in 1836, Mary Ann lived with his administrator, William Jones, who did not claim as part of Britt’s estate.  The lower court found that whether or not Mary Ann was the child of a slave, the verdict was in favor of Jones, the administrator.  The Supreme Court, however, deemed the jury instructions invalid and ordered a new trial.